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COMPETITION AGENCY DESIGN:  
WHAT’S ON THE MENU?  
 




In recent years the United Kingdom and various other countries 
have decided to restructure the institutions responsible for enforcing 
competition laws.  How should a nation choose among myriad alternative 
arrangements?  This paper lays out nine major institutional choices that 
governments must address in designing the implementation mechanism for 
a competition law.  The paper discusses tradeoffs associated with each 
choice and examines interdependencies among different design 
elements.  In doing so, the paper offers a structured framework that 
countries can use in forming new competition systems or altering existing 




In November 2010, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Business, 
Innovation, and Skills (BIS) began an inquiry to explore a fundamental 
redesign of the country’s system of competition law.1  Among other 
measures, the initiative contemplated the dissolution of the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) and Competition Commission (CC) and creation of new 
mechanisms to implement the law.  At some time in the next few years, the 
UK is scheduled to establish a new Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA) to perform functions previously assigned to the predecessor bodies.2 
The decision to retool the UK system is noteworthy for at least two 
reasons.  Firstly, the new regime will replace a system widely regarded to 
be one of the world’s best.  A combination of legislative reforms, inspired 
leadership, and excellent staffing had advanced the UK to the front ranks of 
                                                
* Kovacic is the Global Professor of Competition Law and Policy at the George 
Washington University Law School.  Hyman is the Ross & Helen Workman Chair in Law 
and Professor of Medicine, University of Illinois.  We are grateful to the participants in the 
University of Newcastle conference for many useful comments and suggestions. 
1 Dep’t for Bus. Innovation & Skills, Government launches growth review (Nov. 29, 
2010), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/topstories/2010/Nov/government-launches-
growth-review 
2 The proposal to create the CMA is examined in Peter Freeman, Beware the Ides of 
March – The Government’s Proposed Competition Reforms, __ European Competition J. 
__ (2012). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179279
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the more than 120 jurisdictions that have competition laws.3  Governments 
ordinarily do not tear down and rebuild truly superior mechanisms, 
especially when the measures that achieved greatness are relatively new.  
To take the risks that come with such a drastic renovation makes sense only 
if the new regime promises marked improvements upon the performance of 
its already distinguished predecessor.  
The second striking aspect of the reforms is the manner of their creation.  
With little advance deliberation, BIS launched the initiative with the stated 
aims of simplifying public administration and reducing the costs associated 
with maintaining multiple institutions to perform similar or related policy 
functions.  The UK government’s pledge to pursue basic changes imparted 
considerable momentum for BIS to propose a wholesale makeover.  Yet the 
decision to begin the inquiry and the deliberations in the reform process do 
not appear to have been informed by any overarching framework to 
consider the value of specific adjustments to the UK’s competition policy 
institutions. 
The question of how to design or reform institutions for the 
implementation of competition laws is not merely a parochial concern of the 
United Kingdom.  Recent years have featured major reforms around the 
world.4  France, Portugal, and Spain have combined two existing 
competition agencies into one. Brazil recently folded its three competition 
bodies into a single new institution. The Netherlands is poised to combine 
its regulators responsible for competition law, consumer protection, and the 
postal and telecommunications sectors into a new body. Spain is 
considering a further step of unifying the competition agency with as many 
as six separate sectoral regulators.  Other countries have experimented with 
various institutional reforms including adding and subtracting policy 
functions, creating new quality control mechanisms, and enhancing reliance 
on multinational enforcement networks.  Finally, other countries have 
modified substantive competition law (e.g., adding criminal penalties and 
enhancing private rights of action), which will predictably affect the 
institutional dynamics in which competition agencies operate. 
In this paper we step back from the details of these individual case 
studies, and lay out the implicit “menu” that countries are choosing from in 
designing and/or reforming their competition agencies.  Part I explains the 
logic of focusing on “engineering not physics” and then identifies nine 
                                                
3 For example, OFT and the CC consistently receive high marks in the annual survey 
of antitrust enforcement conducted by the Global Competition Review.  See Global 
Competition Review, Rating Enforcement – The Annual Ranking of the World’s Leading 
Competition Authorities 137-44 (June 2012) (reviewing OFT and the CC). 
4 These are described in William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How 
Structure Shapes Substance, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1019, 1042-43 (2012). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179279
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major institutional design choices that influence the quality and 
effectiveness of competition agencies.  We discuss the trade-offs associated 
with each choice, and review the inter-relationships among individual 
choices.  Part II briefly considers the implications of these dynamics for the 
future of agency design and competition policy.  
4 Competition Agency Design  
 
I. Agency Design: Choices and Consequences 
 
A. The Logic of “Engineering Not Physics”  
This essay focuses on the “engineering” of agency design and 
implementation, rather than the “physics” of substantive policy 
development.5  Our topic does not attract much in the way of academic 
attention or interest; as Professor Peter Schuck has observed: 
 
It is the substantive merits and politics of policy proposals that 
almost always dominates public debates, not the often invisible, 
mundane processes of public administration. Even political 
scientists, who should know better, tend to relegate public 
administration to a relatively obscure corner of their profession. 
Whereas the substance of policy design is considered sexy, the 
process of policy administration is usually seen as, well, boring.6  
 
Even if our topic is, well, boring, we are convinced that it requires more 
attention than has historically been the case.  Competition law assuredly 
presents fascinating questions of doctrine and high theory – but as one of us 
noted in an earlier article 
 
to affect policy, theory cannot be suspended in air. If theory is not 
grounded in the engineering of effective institutions, it will not work 
in practice. The engineering of policy making involves basic 
questions of implementation. It is one thing for the policymaking 
aerodynamicist to conceive a new variety of aircraft. It is another for 
the policy engineer to design and build it. To have elegant physics 
without excellent engineering is a formula for policy failure.”7  
 
                                                
5 William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade 
Commission: Building the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 
J. Telecom. & High Tech. L. 1, 5 (2010) (“The physics of substantive policy routinely 
eclipses the engineering of implementation.”) 
6 Peter H. Schuck, Is a Competent Federal Government Becoming Oxymoronic? 77 
George Washington L. Rev. 973, 975 (2009).  
7 Kovacic, supra note 4, at 5.   
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In another article, drawing from examples across the U.S. government 
and over time, we provide a wide-ranging analysis of the impact of 
agency design on agency behavior.8  This far-shorter essay represents 
our first cut at the issues raised by the design of competition agencies.  
Although we use the BIS proposal as a spring-board, our analysis goes 
well beyond the issues raised by the proposal on the table to fold OFT 
and CC into CMA.      
 
B. What’s on the Menu? 
1. Autonomy v. Accountability  
The establishment of a competition agency requires decisions about its 
relationship to elected officials in the executive and legislative branches of 
government.  Ideally, the agency will be simultaneously autonomous from 
political pressure in exercising its authority to investigate infringements and 
prosecute violations, but accountable for the exercise of its powers and 
expenditure of public resources.  Various design choices influence the 
degree to which these two (admittedly somewhat inconsistent) goals are 
met.   
One common approach to achieving autonomy is to establish the 
competition authority as an “independent” agency.9  In this model, the 
agency’s leaders are given fixed-term appointments, and they may be 
removed only for good cause.  Funding may also be a source of autonomy if 
the agency can obtain resources without recourse to ministerial approval or 
legislative appropriations.  For example, the agency might collect and retain 
user fees as part of the merger review process.  Agency autonomy is also 
enhanced when courts must give deference to its judgments about facts 
and/or law. 
Accountability can be achieved in various ways, some of which involve 
design features that reduce autonomy.  The agency might be constituted as 
an executive branch ministry or subunit of another ministry, and its leaders 
would serve at the pleasure of the head of state or the legislature.  
Accountability is usually established by giving the executive branch and/or 
the legislature direct control of the agency’s budget.  For example, the 
agency’s budget proposals have to be approved by a central executive 
branch body and/or funded through a specific legislative appropriation 
every year.   
                                                
8 David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic,  Government Organization/Reorganization: 
Why Who Does What Matters (forthcoming, 2013).  
9 The possible meanings of “independence” and the tensions between autonomy and 
accountability are discussed in William E. Kovacic, Competition agencies, independence, 
and the political process, in Competition Policy and the Economic Approach – Foundations 
and Limitations 291 (Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber & Rupprecht Podszun eds. 2011). 
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Another accountability strategy is to mandate fuller disclosure about the 
agency’s activities.  For example, an agency might be required to publish 
regular reports about the agency’s activities and operations.  A jurisdiction 
can establish a freedom of information act that compels the agency to 
disclose certain types of information in response to requests by the public.  
The agency also can take voluntary measures to increase accountability, 
including the revelation of data not required by law, frequent public 
appearances by agency leaders to explain and defend policy choices, and 
public consultations in which the agency seeks views about what it should 
do.  As its powers increase, an agency may find that expanded voluntary 
disclosure is necessary to increase its perceived legitimacy.  
Autonomy and accountability are not goals to be sought in their own 
right.  An agency that is completely autonomous (e.g., with tenured 
appointments and a separate income stream) can become isolated from the 
policy decisions that shape the competitive process.  For example, the 
agency might find itself on the outside looking in as executive branch 
ministries and legislatures hammer out legislative packages that will affect 
the competition more deeply than any ten cases the antitrust agency might 
file.  Similarly, an agency that is “too accountable” may spend so much 
time responding to legislative demands/oversight, and public inquiries that 
it is hamstrung.  
 
2. Leadership Structure: Multi-member board or 
unitary executive?  
Competition agencies typically adopt one of two dominant models for 
their leadership structure: either a multi-member board or a unitary 
executive.  A majority of the world’s competition agencies are governed by 
multi-member boards.  By custom or by statute, many countries require that 
the board’s membership to be politically heterogeneous.  The multimember 
board is believed to offer the advantages of diversified expertise, greater 
resistance to capture, and heightened legitimacy.  Multi-member boards are 
also less subject to abrupt shifts in policy in the wake of an election that 
results in a change in power.   
A unitary hierarchy offers its own advantages.  Compared to a board 
whose members may communicate disparate views about what their agency 
should do, a single executive is better able to create a clear “brand” and 
define a coherent program for her agency.  A single executive is more likely 
to quickly reach a decision and implement it than a multi-member board.  
Finally, because decision-making is in the hands of a single individual, it 
less likely the slot will go to an unqualified political supporter.   
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Regrettably, the same cannot be said of the multi-member board model.10    
Hybrid models are relatively uncommon, but do exist.  For example, the 
OFT is headed by a chairman and a chief executive officer, who are advised 
by an external board.  The OFT top officials are not bound by the advice of 
the external board, but the OFT’s custom has been to rely heavily on the 
board for guidance about substantive programs, individual initiatives, and 
matters of administration.  Whether this approach can be employed in other 
jurisdictions depends on the legal status and permissibility of such advisory 
bodies. 
The issue of optimal leadership structure is a policy perennial, which 
has bedeviled presidents, legislators, agency heads, generals, admirals, and 
scholars since the beginning of time.  It is hard to improve on the advice 
proffered by Professor Richard Thaler when the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau was being established: “Above all, I’d urge the head of 
this agency to devise rules under the assumption that, someday, he or she 
will be succeeded by a nitwit.”11  
 
3. Stand-Alone Agency or Subsidiary? 
Most jurisdictions have established the competition agency as a distinct, 
stand-alone body.  A self-contained body has greater ability to establish a 
distinct identify and brand.  The separate agency also can respond to 
changing circumstances without the need to “run things up the ladder,” or to 
coordinate policy with other units in the organization of which it is one part. 
Alternatively, the competition agency can be situated within a larger 
entity.  This is the model used by the European Union (where the 
Directorate General for Competition is but one of 27 directorates of the 
European Commission, and by the United States (where Antitrust is one of 
8 Divisions, five Bureaus, 27 Offices, 4 Programs, 2 Commissions, and 2 
Institutes of the Department of Justice).12  The competition agency benefits 
from the reputation and political power of the larger entity, but it must 
compete with other units for budgetary resources and administrative 
support.  It is also more difficult to create a distinct, respected identify 
amidst a sea of sister subsidiaries.  
 
4. One or Many Enforcement Agencies/Agents? 
Who should enforce a nation’s competition laws?  The simplest model 
                                                
10 See William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the 
Federal Trade Commission, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 915 (1997). 
11 Richard Thaler, Level Playing Fields, in Soccer and Finance, N.Y. Times BU5  
(July 25, 2010) 
12 United States Department of Justice Agencies, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/agencies/index-list.html  
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is to give a single public institution exclusive enforcement authority.  More 
pluralized models come in various flavors.  Consider the range of structural 
models adopted by the United States.  A nation can establish two or more 
public enforcement agencies at the same level of government (e.g. giving 
the FTC and DOJ Antitrust Division shared authority over mergers); it can 
give enforcement power to agencies at multiple levels of government (e.g., 
both the federal government and individual states can enforce the federal 
antitrust laws); it can limit enforcement authority to antitrust-specific 
entities, or responsibility can be shared with sectoral regulators (e.g., the 
Federal Communications Commission’s shared competence with DOJ for 
combinations of telecommunications providers); and it can limit 
enforcement authority to government actors or deputize private actors by 
creating a private right of action.   
Reliance on multiple enforcement agencies serves several distinct 
purposes.  It provides insurance against the possibility that any single agent 
will fail to execute its responsibilities by reason of sloth, resource 
constraints, corruption, capture, or political influence.  Multiplicity also 
creates the basis for rivalry that can lead to improvements in system-wide 
performance.  Multiple agents allow testing of alternative approaches to 
implementation – as with the establishment in the United States in 1914 of 
an administrative commission (the FTC) to supplement the work of an 
existing executive branch enforcement body (DOJ).13 
Multiplicity also has its costs.  The placement of two or more public 
agencies in the same policy domain is almost certain to create tension 
among the institutions, each of which will strive to achieve preeminence 
and greater appropriations.  Such rivalry can readily degenerate into 
competition on margins that do not increase society’s well-being, but 
instead focus on the parochial interests of the institutions.   
Multiplicity can also detract from the coherence of a nation’s 
competition policy.  As the number of enforcement agents increases, no 
single agent may have the ability to determine the selection and timing of 
important litigation matters.  Ill-advised prosecutorial choices by one agent 
may yield doctrines that adversely restrict the capacity of other agents.  
Multiplicity will also impede the ability of a jurisdiction to speak with one 
voice in international fora. 
There are various strategies to address the problems created by 
multiplicity, ranging from hard constraints that establish a strict hierarchy of 
authority (such as the power of the European Commission to displace the 
authority of national competition authorities on matters with broad 
community-wide significance) to the use of “soft law” approaches (such as 
                                                
13 See William E. Kovacic, Downsizing antitrust: is it time to end dual federal 
enforcement?, 41 Antitrust Bull. 505 (Fall 1996). 
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the operation of the European Competition Network).      
 
5. Single-Purpose or Multi-Purpose? 
Some nations have created single-purpose competition authorities, 
whose sole remit is the enforcement of antitrust commands while a majority 
of other nations have formed multi-purpose institutions that also enforce 
other bodies of law.  The most common combination is antitrust plus 
consumer protection statutes and/or public procurement laws, but more 
exotic combinations exist.   
Single-purpose agencies have greater capacity to establish a clear 
institutional “brand” and coherent policy priorities that readily can be 
communicated, but multi-purpose agencies can realize synergies and lower 
the costs associated with coordinating policy between separate institutions 
with related functions.  These synergies will only exist if the functions to be 
combined are true policy complements and do not consist of a rubbish bin 
of dissimilar (or, worse, conflicting) duties.  The greater the diversity of 
functions, the lower the synergies – and harder time a multi-purpose agency 
may have in persuading a reviewing court that it is genuinely expert and 
entitled to deference in all the policy domains assigned to it. 
A multiplicity of functions does provide a safeguard against capture.  
Owing to the breadth and diversity of its duties, a multi-purpose agency 
provides a more elusive target for any single industry group.  To be sure, 
most competition agencies have regulatory authority over a broad array of 
industries and firms, and these cross-cutting commercial interests provide a 
built-in buffer against capture.   
 
6. Law Enforcement or Competition Policy? 
Countries differ in whether the competition agency is accorded a narrow 
or more expansive ambit.  A narrow conception of the agency’s role 
emphasizes its law enforcement functions (e.g., conducting investigations 
and prosecuting infringements of the law).  A broader conception of the 
agency’s role allows it to function as an advocate for competition (e.g., by 
performing studies and appearing before other government bodies to urge 
them to consider the importance of promoting competition when adopting 
policies).  This advocacy role makes it possible for the agency to protect the 
marketplace from public restraints on competition, which are likely to be 
more durable than private restraints.  
 “Advocacy” authority will expand the competition agency’s field of 
play but doing so has important political consequences.  When an agency is 
seen to be performing only law enforcement functions, elected officials will 
pay a political cost for interfering.  Conversely, when an agency engages in 
advocacy activities, it will be seen as fair game by the ministers and 
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legislators being lobbied – and they will reasonably respond by attempting 
to influence the agency’s priorities, preferences, and funding.   
Stated differently, advocacy entails forays into matters that elected 
officials regard as their policy domain.  An agency that enters political 
neighborhoods can expect to face greater buffeting than it encounters when 
it prosecutes a case in the courts.   
 
7. Remedies: What’s in the Toolkit? 
Should violation of a nation’s competition laws constitute civil offenses, 
crimes, or both?  The enhancement of sanctions can increase the 
competition agency’s credibility and its ability to deter violations.  But, 
ratcheting up sanctions will have institutional side effects.  Most nations 
reserve the authority to prosecute crimes to an executive branch department, 
such as a ministry of justice or an office of the public prosecutor.  If 
competition enforcement is vested in an independent administrative agency, 
bringing a criminal case will require collaboration between the agency 
(which usually performs the investigation) and the prosecutor (who decides 
whether to file the criminal case).  Differences of opinion are likely, but 
cooperation is necessary if promises of leniency made by the competition 
agency are to be credible and effective. 
 
8. Internal Design 
How should the competition agency be organized internally?  
Although there are multiple variations, the obvious possibilities are by 
professional training (e.g., lawyers in one bureau, and economists in 
another); by substantive body of law being enforced (e.g., separate bureaus 
for antitrust and for consumer protection); or by line of business (e.g., 
separate units for health care, transportation, and media).  Of course, 
various hybrid arrangements are possible as well.  There is also variation in 
the design of the veto-gates through which information, recommendations, 
and decisions must flow.   
These internal design features can have real consequences.  For the 
first forty years of its existence, the FTC put attorneys and economists in 
separate bureaus.14  From 1954 to 1960, it combined attorneys and 
economists into a single bureau.  In 1960, it switched back to separate 
bureaus, and has followed that approach ever since.  As a contemporaneous 
account reflected, prior to the merger, “the economists . . . disagreed 
vehemently with the economic approach being taken by the legal division, 
and the lawyers wanted greater control over the economists.”15  Combining 
                                                
14 See Luke M. Froeb, Paul A. Pautler & Lars-Hendrik Roller, The Economics of 
Organizing Economists, 76 Antitrust L.J. 569 (2009).  
15 See Willard Mueller, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks for Bureau of Economics 
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the economists and lawyers into a single bureau meant that the economists 
reported to the lawyers – which meant that the views of the lawyers 
invariably prevailed, irrespective of whether they represented sound 
economics or not.  Separate bureaus helped allow both perspectives to be 
presented to decision-makers, and ensured that disciplinary norms prevailed 
over the demands of one’s supervisor – and the felt necessities of pursuing 
any given case.     
To be sure, other factors (e.g., national and agency culture, the 
personalities of those involved) will mediate the impact of these design 
dynamics on the quality and quantity of outputs generated by the 
competition agency.  But, it does not follow that one should ignore the 
significance of internal design features on the quality and quantity of those 
outputs.    
 
9. Procedural Fairness and Institutional Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a fundamental attribute of any legal system worthy of the 
name – and procedural fairness is an important way to create and enhance 
legitimacy.  The enforcement of a competition law entails several discrete 
tasks: the investigation of possible wrongdoing, the decision to prosecute, 
the determination of culpability, and the imposition of sanctions.  In the 
design of a competition system, a jurisdiction can unbundle these functions, 
or combine them within a single entity.  
Many countries unbundle decision-making tasks, using a “prosecutorial 
model.”  Under this approach, the competition agency makes the decision to 
investigate and to prosecute cases, but disputes are presented for decision to 
a separate entity/tribunal – sometimes courts of general jurisdiction, 
sometimes specialist competition law tribunals.  The external tribunal also 
controls the decision to impose sanctions.  Such unbundling is the rule when 
criminal sanctions are sought. 
Conversely, the US FTC and the European Commission are examples of 
integration of these functions within a single entity.  In the FTC, the board 
members control the decision to apply significant information gathering 
powers, the decision to issue complaints, and, ultimately, the determination 
(following an administrative trial before an administrative law judge) of 
culpability.  Although adverse decisions may be appealed to independent 
courts, the judges are required to give deference to the FTC’s administrative 
                                                                                                                       
Contributions to Law Enforcement, Research and Economic Knowledge and Policy: 
Bureau of Economics Contribution to Antitrust Enforcement 24-26 (September 4, 2003), 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/directorsconference/docs/directorstableGOOD.pdf#page
=17.   See also Willard F. Mueller, The Revival of Economics at the FTC in the 1960s, 25 
Rev. Indus. Org. 91 (2004). 
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determinations.  The EC integrates these functions to an even higher degree 
than the FTC.  The EC has authority to impose administrative fines 
(including fines of over $1 billion in an abuse of dominance case against 
Intel) and to block mergers without recourse to an external judicial process.   
The decision to unbundle or integrate involves tradeoffs between 
decision-making speed and expertise v. quality control and legitimacy.  
Tighter integration can accelerate investigation and resolution, by placing 
the key tasks in the hands of a body with specialized expertise.  At the same 
time, integration can create difficulties with quality control problems, and 
also undermines procedural fairness.   
The overall objective of any system is to generate substantively sound 
outcomes – but when all the relevant decisions are integrated into the same 
institution, it is more difficult for earlier decisions (including the decision to 
prosecute the case in the first instance) to be revisited.  Instead, various 
bureaucratic pathologies increase the chances the case will simply run on 
auto-pilot, even if the original assessment was flawed, or circumstances 
have changed in the interim.  Agencies can create internal safeguards to 
minimize such problems, including walling off the “case team” from the 
personnel that will ultimately decide issues of culpability, and requiring 
periodic “hard looks” at the evidence by those who are not already involved 
in the case.16  
Those who are skeptical of the merits of any given lawsuit will not be 
impressed by such safeguards, and will emphasize the unfairness of having 
the same entity act as “judge, jury, and executioner” and deride the 
proceedings as a “kangaroo court.”  Notwithstanding the efficiency-
enhancing benefits of integration, a nation that bundles prosecutorial and 
adjudicatory powers together is likely to incur real costs in the form of 
diminished perceptions of procedural fairness and legitimacy.  
  
II. Choosing From the Menu: What Can Be Done Going Forward?  
Now that we have laid out an array of choices that each country must 
make (whether explicitly or implicitly) in designing a competition agency, 
we turn to the ways in which the menu can assist individual jurisdictions 
interested in improving their institutional arrangements.  We note three 
major applications. 
First, for countries that have yet to adopt a competition law, the menu 
lays out the range of options and the consequences of various design 
choices.  Instead of generic advice (i.e., “just copy [fill in the reader’s 
preferred competition agency]”), countries can use the menu to make more 
nuanced and informed decisions when designing their own implementation 
                                                
16 Froeb, supra note 14 (discussing effect on competition agency decision-making of 
placing economists in separate organization unit). 
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arrangements.  Even if political imperatives make certain choices inevitable, 
and place other choices off-limits, the menu empowers the newly created 
competition authority with knowledge of the predictable consequences and 
trade-offs of those constrained choices.  Stated differently, our menu 
provides the equivalent of the package insert that accompanies the 
dispensing of a prescription drug, listing various warnings and the known 
side effects.   
What of jurisdictions that have already adopted competition laws?  The 
last two decades have seen a precipitous increase in the number of countries 
with competition agencies – meaning that many countries have already 
chosen from among the nine design attributes enumerated in Part I.  
Countries made these choices for many reasons: to accommodate the 
desires of other countries or donor organizations, to satisfy national political 
imperatives, to deal with resource constraints (whether of personnel or tax 
revenues to fund the effort), and so on.  These early design choices 
inevitably affect the perceived plausible choice set going forward.  Stated 
differently, existing institutional arrangements create a status quo bias – 
which constrains the possible alternatives – or at least creates political 
opposition to change, irrespective of the details of the proposal.  Of course, 
this does not mean that countries are locked into existing institutional 
arrangements.  Instead, there is actually considerable dynamism, as nations 
propose various design revisions in light of their own experiences and 
changing priorities.  But, it does mean that there is likely to be opposition to 
any proposed reform, no matter its details.   
Innovation in agency design for such countries is likely to proceed in 
three distinct stages: identification of weaknesses in existing arrangements; 
development of a reform proposal; and then a battle over whether to adopt 
the proposal.  Our menu permits a more informed stock-taking of benefits 
and costs at each stage of this process.  We should not expect a country to 
get everything right on the first try, any more than we would expect the first 
prototype of a new commercial airliner to be perfectly suited for full-scale 
production.  Test flights enable an aerospace company to identify 
improvements that will make the production model a far superior aircraft.  
The only way to know how the prototype performs is to fly it.  Similarly, 
the only way to understand the quality of a competition system design is to 
implement it.  Quality improvement will not occur without a deliberate 
commitment to regular evaluation of system performance.   
Finally, by structuring the analysis, the menu should facilitate 
benchmarking and performance comparisons across multiple jurisdictions.  
We now have enough history with the implementation of competition law 
that jurisdictions can build on the experiences of one another, instead of 
proceeding based on guess-work and hope.  Sir Isaac Newton memorably 
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observed that he was able to see further only by “standing on the shoulders 
of giants.”  Nations will enjoy similar benefits in deciding how to construct 
a new competition agency, or improve upon an existing regime.  
   
CONCLUSION 
 
Thomas Wolfe memorably observed “you can’t go home again.”  But, 
when it comes to competition law, a country can and should periodically go 
home again – to revisit the origins of its existing arrangements and consider 
how to improve them.  It is less important where a nation begins with its 
competition law than whether it seeks improvements over time.  A habit of 
routine assessment and adjustment increases the likelihood that a 
jurisdiction will progress toward better (not best) performance and practice.   
We hope that our menu will prove a useful tool in this process of 
continuous institutional refinement.  We do not expect that the development 
and execution of improvements can or should take place rapidly.  It often 
will take time to determine how a specific set of arrangements is 
performing. Patience is required, to assess whether any given institutional 
arrangement is up to the tasks it has been given.  If the cycle of change is 
too short, we may never fully appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of 
any given design.  The period of testing has to be long enough that we can 
make confident judgments about what has (and has not) worked.   
Finally, it is important not to slight the costs of reorganizations and 
other makeovers of an existing institution.  These adjustments are invariably 
disruptive, and do not always work.  These costs and risks are likely to be 
smaller, and more likely to be worth incurring if they follow a process of 
patient experimentation, reflection, and benchmarking.  Even if the demand 
for reorganization is driven by larger political and/or fiscal realities, there is 
almost always room for improving the process.  
To complete our test flight metaphor, when it comes to agency design, a 
vertical ascent can easily be a precursor to a vertical plunge, followed 
shortly thereafter by a “controlled flight into terrain.”17  A vector of gradual 
cumulative improvement is likely to work out better for pilots, passengers, 
and the owners of the airline.    
                                                
17 See E.L. Wiener, Controlled Flight Into Terrain Accidents: System-Induced Errors, 
19 Human Factors 171 (1977) (“controlled flight into terrain accidents are those in which 
an aircraft, under the control of the crew, is flown into terrain (or water) with no prior 
awareness on the part of the crew of the impending disaster.”) 
